The Dissolution of the Soviet Union and its Impact on Cuba

Introduction

On January 1, 1959, the world bore witness to a pivotal moment in the Cold War: the success of Fidel Castro’s communist revolution. Long considered a trinket of the US, Cuba appeared to be an inconsequential player in the ideological furor that had begun to sweep through Latin America. Cuba’s transition to communism dismissed any such notions of irrelevancy and transformed the nature of Cuba’s international relationships. Predictably, anger and fear characterized the United States’ response to the Cuban Revolution—by 1959, the US adopted a reactionary, aggressive approach to dealing with communism in Latin America (Bowen 1983, 92).  Of more interest was the establishment of a previously unthinkable alliance between Cuba and the USSR. 

Until the success of the Cuban Revolution, the US’s purported hegemony in the Western Hemisphere prevented the USSR from attempting to make inroads in Latin America. The Soviets remained hesitant to establish an alliance with Cuba even after the communist takeover, uncertain as they were about the nature of Cuba’s ideology and the ferocity with which the US might respond. Eventually, however, a year of back and forth gave way to an alliance that would shape the course of the Cold War. Over the following four decades, the Soviets funneled billions of dollars in aid to Cuba, supplied its government with military equipment, and helped steer the direction of communism in Cuba. Their shared Marxist-Leninist ideology provided a foundation for their alliance and a safeguard of loyalty against the political turmoil in the rest of Latin America. 

Considering the degree of entanglement between the USSR and Cuba—and particularly, the degree to which Cuba depended on the USSR for its survival—the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 should have spelled the end of Cuba. Instead, the country managed to struggle on and remain communist, weathering an economic catastrophe and generating internal questions about its political structures. The reasons for Cuba’s survival are multifaceted but can be boiled down as such: by the time the USSR collapsed, the Cuban-Soviet relationship was already drastically strained. This was brought about by economic, ideological, and political disagreements born from fundamentally different interpretations of communism in addition to the steady weakening of the Soviet economy and outside pressures from the US to democratize and reestablish diplomatic relations. Thus, while Cuba’s separation from the USSR proved economically painful, that same separation ensured that Cuba survived the end of the Cold War. 

A Brief History of Soviet-Cuban Relations From 1959 to 1985

Caution dominated the USSR’s initial policies toward Cuba. Doubtful of Castro’s political leanings and still somewhat resigned to US dominance over the Western hemisphere, the USSR approached Cuba tentatively and with low expectations (Samson 2008, 89). Cuban sentiment mirrored that of their future ally. Castro viewed Soviet communism as “impure,” finding it less revolutionary and more bureaucratic than the kind of socialism he hoped to implement. Such perceptions led Castro to reject initial attempts to label him as a Marxist-Leninist, exacerbating the USSR’s concerns about Cuba’s ideological direction (Katz 1983, 90). However, as Cuba’s relationship with the US soured, resulting in economic and security concerns that threatened Cuba’s existence, talks between Cuban and Soviet officials intensified. Castro understood that Cuba needed Soviet protection to resist US oppression. The Soviets, though still wary, joined Cuba in allyship, believing that any drawbacks to the alliance would be far outweighed by the power and prestige the USSR would gain from having an unexpected foothold in Latin America (Samson 2008, 90). In early February 1960, Cuba and the USSR consummated their budding alliance with Soviet Vice Premier Anastas Mikoyan’s visit to Cuba and the Soviet Union’s subsequent agreement to buy Cuban sugar in exchange for Soviet oil (“Castro and the Cold War” n.d.).

Despite the uneasy start of the Soviet-Cuban alliance, Cuba and the USSR would become increasingly intertwined over the next three decades, particularly as it pertained to trade and subsidies. Though Castro attempted to diversify the Cuban economy in the first part of the 1960s, the failure of industrialization coupled with a ballooning trade deficit pushed Cuba back to its economic status quo: monoculture sugar production. The Soviets encouraged the return – the cost of producing sugar in the Soviet bloc was much higher than in Cuba, theoretically making monoculture sugar farming in Cuba profitable for the USSR (Tsokhas 1980, 321). In January 1964, the Soviets formed a new trade agreement with Cuba: between 1965 and 1970, the USSR would purchase over 24 million tons of sugar. However, even after the abandonment of Castro’s original economic plans, the Cuban economy continued to struggle. From 1964 to 1970, Cuba had a cumulative trade deficit of 1,508 million rubles with the USSR (Tsokhas 1980, 326). To keep the Cuban economy afloat, the USSR had to purchase sugar and nickel well above the world price whilst also selling Cuba machinery and petroleum at artificially low prices (Binns 1996, 42). Overall, between 1960 and 1983, the USSR provided US$33 billion worth of economic assistance in the form of repayable loans, grants, subsidized imports, and exports to Cuba (Binns 1996, 41).

As Cuba grew increasingly indebted to the USSR, it adopted economic and political structures that increasingly resembled those of its benefactor. The failure of Guevara’s “Cuban Road” to economic development prompted the USSR to send Soviet advisors to Cuba to supervise the country’s economic growth. Soviet approaches to economic management, organization, and planning quickly became commonplace, a fact emphasized by Cuba’s entrance into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in 1972 (Tsokhas 1980, 331). Established by the Soviet Union in 1949 to coordinate the economic development of communist states, COMECON wound up subsidizing Cuban trade to the detriment of Cuba’s economic diversification: by 1989, Cuba relied on the COMECON trade block for around 80 percent of all its trade (Morris, 37). Cuba’s economic entanglement with the USSR would go on to color not only its economic development during the Cold War, but also its political and ideological aims.

Though their shared communist ideology provided the foundation for their initial alliance and subsequent economic relations, Cuba and the USSR struggled to reconcile the differences in their respective versions of socialism. Until he assumed power and formally established relations with the Soviet Union, Castro rejected Marxist-Leninist ideology, preferring a Cuban path to socialism. The eventual adoption of a Marxist-Leninist ideology stemmed more so out of political necessity than an enduring belief in its value (Samson 2008, 92). However, Castro’s concession would do little to ease the other ideological differences between Cuba and the USSR. While Cuba favored a gung-ho, revolutionary approach to spreading communism, emblemized by Guevara’s foquismo theory, the Soviets feared the military power of the US and called for Latin American socialists to pursue the peaceful road towards socialism (Katz 1983, 90). The ideological schism between the two countries became blatantly obvious via the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. 

Moscow’s decision to install nuclear warheads in Cuba arguably sparked one of the most dangerous incidents of the Cold War and revealed the differences in Cuban and Soviet approaches to geopolitics and conflict. After the US discovered Moscow’s plan and placed an embargo on Cuba, the Soviet-Cuban alliance faced a crossroads: they could stand their ground or attempt to appease the US While Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev opted for de-escalation, Castro called for Cuba and the USSR to remain resolute in the face of US pressure, even going so far as to call for a nuclear first-strike against the US (“Letter from Castro to Khrushchev” 1962). Rather than heed Castro’s demands, which the Soviets designated as the ravings of a madman, Khrushchev entered private negotiations with John F. Kennedy, thus excluding Cuba from any negotiations. Moscow’s actions incensed and embarrassed Castro, leading him to denounce Khrushchev’s actions as a betrayal (Samson 2008, 94). Castro would continue to hold a grudge for the duration of the Soviet-Cuban alliance, but the massive power imbalance between the countries—in large part informed by their economic dependence—prevented Castro from taking drastic action. 

From the 1960s through the 1980s, Cuba and the USSR continued to quibble over their approaches to revolution in the Third World. Cuba worked to “export revolutions” in Latin America and beyond, as exemplified by their military interventions in Bolivia in 1967 and Angola in 1975 (Katz 1983, 99).  Though the USSR provided military aid and equipment to Cuba, by and large, the Soviets focused on strengthening existing communist regimes rather than seeking to create new ones. Ideological tensions between Cuba and the USSR eased after bitter polemics in the late 1960s, during which the Soviets threatened to cut off aid to Cuba (Katz 1983, 100). However, resentments lingered, providing the groundwork for the dissolution of relations between Cuba and the USSR in the late 1980s. 

The Beginning of the End: Soviet-Cuban Relations from 1985-1991

The mid-1980s found the USSR and Cuba in troublesome economic and political straits. Years of poor centralized planning had led to economic stagnation in the USSR—by the early 1980s, GNP growth had slowed whilst productivity growth fell below zero (Joint Economic Committee 1982). Meanwhile, Cuba’s economic deficits continued to mount. In 1984, Cuba’s merchandise trade deficit climbed to 1.75 billion pesos as exports stagnated and imports boomed (Pérez-López 1990, 4). To compound matters, both countries suffered mounting political pressure as Latin America re-democratized and Eastern European countries called for free elections. Throughout the 1980s, major military dictatorships throughout Latin America fell, starting with Argentina in 1983 and ending in 1990 with the ousting of Augusto Pinochet in Chile. While quick to deny any accusations of dictatorial tendencies, Castro, as Cuba's domineering leader, was deeply unsettled by the downfall of fellow strongmen around him (Sondrol 1991). US President Ronald Reagan only made matters worse for the Soviet-Cuban alliance as he pursued the destruction of the “Evil Empire.”

Though the USSR and Cuba both recognized the need to adapt to the challenges facing them, the two countries had vastly different visions for the future of socialism. While new Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev pursued the political and economic liberalization of the Soviet Union through his Perestroika and Glasnost policies, Castro sought a return to a more idealistic model of socialism via his campaign of rectification (Bain 2011, 769). Gorbachev’s and Castro’s opposing views proved a blessing and a curse, particularly for Cuba. Although the two countries found cooperation progressively more difficult, Cuba’s increasing economic and ideological separation, built upon the frustrations of the previous three decades, helped safeguard Cuba from the political effects of the USSR’s collapse in 1991. The Cuban economy would not escape quite as unscathed – the collapse of its greatest benefactor torpedoed the Cuban economy in spite of any growing economic separation.

Despite its own economic troubles, the USSR continued to subsidize the Cuban economy throughout the second half of the 1980s. From 1984 to 1988, the USSR provided more than $24 billion in economic assistance in the form of subsidies, trade credits, and development aid (US Department of State 1990, 1). The Soviets paid over 11 times the world price for Cuban sugar and continued to export subsidized oil to Cuba (Bain 2011, 777). However, even as it provided aid, the Soviet Union grew increasingly resentful of the economic burden Cuba represented. The economic goal of Gorbachev’s Perestroika was to resuscitate the Soviet economy by implementing market-based reforms. The continued subsidization of Cuba proved contrary to such goals at a time when the Soviet economy could ill-afford impediments to its transformation. As a letter from Soviet citizens to the Soviet newspaper Socialist Industry put it, “Why must we [the USSR] help everybody else...when we don't have enough for ourselves?” (US Department of State 1989, 1).

To compound matters, Castro’s ideological differences with Gorbachev compelled him to speak openly against the economic components of Perestroika, even as Cuba continued to receive Soviet aid. In his July 26, 1989, Rebellion Day Address, Castro scathingly denounced Perestroika and declared that Cuba would not experiment with any “method that smells of capitalism” (US Department of State 1990, 3). Castro stuck ardently by his Rectification Campaign, which aimed to “rectify” the Cuban economy by recentralizing it in the hands of the Communist Party (Pérez-López 1990, 13). Aside from finding Castro’s plan foolish, Moscow regarded Castro’s actions as an ungrateful act of rebellion, considering the efforts the USSR made to keep the Cuban economy afloat for the previous three decades. In a reminder of its economic superiority over Cuba, the USSR reduced oil and wheat shipments to Cuba to force Castro to moderate his criticisms (US Department of State 1989, 3).

However, the Soviet Union found itself unable to fully cut off economic relations with Cuba. Though Gorbachev had no interest in winning the Cold War, Cuba remained a symbol of Soviet prestige and benevolence; to end relations with Cuba would be to confirm the dwindling power of the USSR (Samson 2008, 102). Furthermore, 30 years’ worth of substantial economic relations ensured the continuance of Soviet-Cuban trade. Cuba, as the sixth largest trading partner of the USSR, played an important role in the Soviet economy as did the USSR in the Cuban economy (US Department of State 1990, 1). Nonetheless, the Soviet Union managed to reduce its economic assistance to Cuba in the latter half of the 1980s. Concerned with its own economic predicament and irritated by Castro’s belligerence, the USSR reduced its implicit subsidization of the Cuban economy starting in 1985 and ended the subsidized exchange of Cuban sugar for Soviet oil in 1989 (Ritter 1990, 124). In 1990, the USSR announced that all trade with Cuba would be conducted in hard currency rather than Soviet rubles. Predictions estimated that Cuba would lose between $1.5 billion to $2.5 billion worth of Soviet support as a result of the changeover (Gertz 1990).

The economic troubles of the late 1980s foreshadowed the economic disasters waiting in the 1990s. Though Cuba had begun to plan a new structure for its economy and had time to adapt to some reductions in Soviet aid, the collapse of the Soviet Union would still devastate trade and a Cuban economy modeled after the Soviet bloc economies. 

Cuba’s economic dependence on the USSR had consequences outside of the Cuban economy. Politically, the country’s dependence fueled the existing ideological tensions between Cuba and the USSR. As highlighted by the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro resented the power imbalance that characterized the Soviet-Cuban alliance (Samson 2008, 94). Cuba’s indebtedness to the USSR, combined with the Soviets’ willingness to impose economic reforms on the Cuban economy, only exacerbated Castro’s indigency. In openly lambasting Perestroika and refusing to adopt Soviet reform measures, Castro could reclaim some of Cuba’s political and economic agency. Furthermore, Perestroika confirmed for Castro his belief that Cuban socialism was in some way “purer” than Soviet socialism (US Department of State 1990, 3). To rescue Cuba from its economic and political issues, Castro embraced a return to 1960s era Cuban socialism. In a 1989 speech to commemorate the anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro asserted that “moral erosion” endangered Cuba’s revolution. Only a return to Cuba’s socialist roots—which entailed a reduction in bureaucracy and inefficiency, the outlawing of private enterprise, and an increase in voluntary work—could Cuba recover from the degradation Soviet economic influence had caused (Bain 2011, 776). 

Another point of persisting tension concerned foreign policy. While Moscow curtailed its support of revolutionary groups in the latter half of the 1980s, Cuba made no similar commitment (US Department of State 1990, 4). Believing it Cuba’s “internationalist right and duty” to assist revolutions in Latin America, Castro continued to supply arms to Nicaragua and sponsor the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), even as the USSR called for diplomatic solutions to regional conflicts (US Department of State 1990, 4). The reduction of military aid from $2.1 billion in 1985 to $1.5 billion in 1990 served as yet another indicator of the two countries diverging foreign policy paths (Adams 1989, 114; McManus 1991). 

To further complicate matters, the US continuously pressured the USSR to cut off relations with Cuba. On November 13, 1989, before the annual assembly of the Organization of American States, US Secretary of State James Barker announced that “Soviet behavior toward Cuba and Central America remains the biggest obstacle to a full across-the-board improvement in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union” (US Department of State 1989, 1). Long irked by Cuba’s resistance to its hegemony, the US hoped to capitalize on its improving relationship with the Soviets to weaken Cuba. President George H.W. Bush made it clear to Gorbachev that US-Soviet relations could not improve until Soviet troops had been removed from Cuba. In response, Gorbachev withdrew all Soviet troops from Cuba in 1991, much to the anger of Castro, who feared for Cuba’s security (Bain 2011, 778). The USSR’s turn to the US confirmed Castro’s assumptions that the USSR was embracing capitalism and discarding socialism. 

Cuban media gave voice to the country’s continuous economic and political grievances with the Soviet Union. Though hesitant at first to criticize its allies, Cuban news outlets grew increasingly bold as Soviet-Cuban relations soured. In 1989, Granma, the newspaper of the Cuban communist party, publicized Castro’s derisive comments about the USSR in addition to criticisms of the “anti-Cuban” sentiments proliferating in Soviet publications (Broder 2021). Furthermore, to discredit Perestroika, a Gorbachev-led effort to restructure the communist economy and political system, Castro utilized the Cuban media to portray to the Cuban people an exaggerated picture of the political and economic crises plaguing the USSR (Samson 2008, 103). For its part, media in the USSR grew increasingly critical of Cuba as glasnost accelerated – particularly harsh criticisms from Soviet publications “Moscow News” and “Sputnik” led to the two publications’ banning in Cuba (US Department of State 1990, 4).

Taken in conjunction, the criticisms and censorship of the Soviet Union in Cuban media illustrated to the Cuban public the chasm between the two countries’ political and economic realities. The USSR, put simply, was considered a separate entity from Cuba, unwilling and unable to stick to the core tenets of socialism and aid its ally. As a result of this ideological “separateness,” when the Soviet Union collapsed, Cuba had some shielding from the ideological fallout, even as its own economy crumbled. 

The Collapse of the Soviet Union and its Aftermath

Though the USSR had become increasingly beleaguered over the latter half of the 1980s, no country could have predicted that 1991 would end with the spectacular implosion of the Soviet bloc. The conflict that had characterized the past fifty years had simply ceased to exist, forcing countries into a scramble to reorient themselves in the new world order. Cuba, in particular, faced an uphill battle on not one, but two fronts. Firstly, Cuba had to contend with an ailing economy that incurred great losses due to the USSR’s collapse. Secondly, Cuba had to figure out how it would survive politically in the aftermath of communism’s apparent failure. The combined burden of Cuba’s problems seemed too immense for a country of Cuba’s stature, making inevitable the country’s collapse. However, despite Cuba’s serious economic travails, the brief recovery of the Cuban economy in the 1990s combined with its ideological separation from the USSR allowed Cuba to survive the end of the Cold War. 

After the Russian Federation slashed the remainder of Soviet assistance to Cuba in 1992, Cuban trade with the former Soviet bloc virtually disappeared (Hernández-Catá 2001). The loss of Cuba’s most significant economic partner destroyed the Cuban economy. From 1989 to 1993, Cuban imports fell by 70% and GDP fell by almost 50%. Industrial production fell to 15% of its capacity as the sugar harvest halved in the span of three years. Castro’s Rectification Campaign required re-thinking as the Cuban government declared a “Special Period in Time of Peace” in 1990 (Hamilton 2002, 23). Cuba’s economy, which had not only been heavily dependent on the USSR but tailored to fit its ally’s needs, needed time to recover and reinvent itself. 

By late 1993, it had become apparent that the Cuban economy required reform. Shortages and rationing queues multiplied while inflation threatened to spiral out of control. Though Castro’s long-term goal remained the survival of socialism, Castro acquiesced to the suggestion that he could liberalize the Cuban economy before the patience of the Cuban population ran out. From 1993 to 1996, Cuba converted Soviet-style state farms to basic cooperative production units, decriminalized the use of hard currency, legalized self-employment, and decreased state expenditure (Hernández-Catá 2001). Such changes, although antithetical to Castro’s ideology, saved the Cuban economy from immediate collapse. From 1994 to 1996, the Cuban economy showed significant rates of growth, though it would take until 2010 for Cuba’s GDP to reach pre-1989 levels (Hamilton 2002, 24). The issue of debt remained, but the restructuring of debt, combined with significant levels of debt forgiveness from Japan, Mexico, and Russia, allowed the Cuban economy to keep functioning until the present (Frank 2013). 

One of the more remarkable aspects of Cuba’s economic recovery was the fact that the economy had time to recover. Given the Soviet Union’s collapse and the Cuban government’s struggles, it would not have come as a surprise if the populace of Cuba decided to rid itself of its communist government before any significant changes could be enacted. After all, communism had seemingly “lost” the Cold War while capitalism had “won” (Fukuyama 1989, 1). However, as aforementioned, Cuba’s ideological separateness from the USSR allowed its citizens to see the collapse of the Soviet bloc as an event independent of Cuba and its brand of socialism. Capitalizing on previous Cuban frustrations and the sentiments informed by Cuban media in the late 1980s, Cuban officials framed the collapse of the Soviet Union as a condemnation of Perestroika and the “un-pure” nature of Soviet communism (Broder 2021).

Cuban media outlets further shaped the narrative surrounding the USSR’s collapse by emphasizing the social problems former communist countries faced after transitioning to capitalism. Common media narratives included the notion that Western leaders had “tricked” former communist nations into turning capitalist, and that Cuba’s survival relied on the avoidance of “ideological softness” (Broder 2021). Concurrently, prominent papers, such as Granma, avoided serious criticisms of the ongoing economic and political troubles in Cuba. The narrative Cuban officials wanted to paint was simple: imperfect socialism was better than no socialism (Broder 2021). When read in conjunction with the assertions that Cuban socialism trumped Soviet communism, the choice of imperfect socialism over capitalism found broad appeal among the Cuban public, allowing for communist Cuba to continue to survive. 

Conclusion

For a country of its size and stature, Cuba demonstrated a remarkable degree of resilience during the Cold War. Starting with its shock rebellion in 1959, Cuba resisted time and time again the military might of the US While in an alliance with the Soviet Union, Cuba continued to pave its own road to socialism, though admittedly, it did concede on some economic and political points to appease its powerful allies. Nevertheless, in the same way Cuba constantly pushed against American imperialism, Cuba rebuffed Soviet influence. Throughout its alliance with the USSR, Cuba maintained its own sense of identity in contesting the USSR’s economic, political, and ideological expectations. As a result, even though the Cuban economy was heavily dependent on the USSR, communist Cuba was able to survive the Soviet bloc’s collapse. Today, Cuba is not without its problems: aside from having lost most of its international prestige, the Cuban economy remains tumultuous. However, Cuba’s history of defiance and resilience should serve as a signal that Cuba will continue to fight for its place in the world. 

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