Between Absence and Presence: Reconceptualizing State and Informal Governance in Medellín

Introduction

In 2014, Medellín earned the “Urban Miracle” title, transforming from a murder capital to a model city (Franz 2017: 53). However, before this, the city was plagued by violence, corruption, and fear due to drug cartels and paramilitary groups. Beginning in the 1950s, the decline of its primary industry – textiles – left Medellín unable to provide adequate employment for its rapidly growing population (Biczynska 2020: 103). The expansion of large informal settlements, built and inhabited by migrant workers, along the city's mountainous outskirts, coupled with the expansion of the informal economy, including drug trafficking, led to significant social disorder. Over time, Medellín became synonymous with urban crime and violent deaths (Melguizo 2001: 114). These social disorders posed constant challenges to Medellín’s governability. With the insecurity and precariousness of the legal system, state-led governance was ineffective. Marginalized informal neighborhoods often came under the domination of different criminal organizations or armed groups, which operated as substitutes for the state, providing public service, collecting taxes, and exercising territorial control. In response, scholars have sought to conceptualize the emergence of these alternative forms of governance, offering varied explanations for their origins and interpreting the state's role in different ways. Some scholars believe that this informal yet organized governance by regional armed groups indicates a failure on the part of the state government, and defines the informal governance provider and the official state as non-intersecting spheres (Melguizo 2001, Betancur 2007, Moncado 2016, Sotomayor 2016). Other scholars, however, suggest that the state enables and permits these alternative forms of governance, with the state as a parallel actor often intersecting with and forming strategic alliances with informal groups (Rozema 2008, Civico 2012, Rueda 2016). In this view, the relationship between the state and informal groups is intertwined, and its collaboration indicates the manifestation of the state's effective presence. In this literature review, I examine how variations in methodologies and units of analysis shape the differing ways these two groups of scholars conceptualize the state's role and its relationship with informal groups. This review will attempt to address apparent inconsistencies within the extant literature. Specifically, the paper seeks to review the binary framework of state “absence” versus state “presence” in urban governance, and potentially, bridge these polarized perspectives, offering a more nuanced understanding of how informal governance emerges and functions alongside, within, or in opposition to formal state structures in future research. Therefore, in marginalized urban settings characterized by socio-economic precarity, how do new state-society and formal-informal relations emerge, and what does this reveal about the fluid and adaptive nature of governance? 

Existing Literature Overview

Existing scholars adopt multiple terminologies to describe alternative governance providers. These range from broader generalizations, such as informal groups (Betancur 2007), armed groups or gangs (Melguizo 2001, Moncada 2016), or organized crime (Sotomayor 2016). Some scholars specify branches of these informal groups - for instance, paramilitaries (Rozema 2008, Civico 2012, Rueda 2016). Although individual scholars stick to a specific term throughout their work, the terminology varies unevenly across the literature, referring to the same phenomenon or research project. This inconsistency stems from the multiple and overlapping components that fall under the category of “informal groups,” including gangs, paramilitaries, guerrillas, and drug-related organizations. To avoid confusion and maintain consistency in this literature review, I primarily use the term “informal groups” as an umbrella category. I also align with the term “paramilitaries” when scholars explicitly demand a specific focus on their role as a subset of these groups.

Scholars Betancur, Meiguizo, Moncado, and Sotomayor argue that the state has failed to govern Medellín. Its limited power produced a governance vacuum, prompting citizens to turn to or submit to informal groups for alternatives. Meiguizo describes the state’s failure as “the disintegration of the legal and central power” (Meiguizo 2001: 113), which led informal groups to emerge as public service providers. Likewise, Sotomayor agrees with Meiguizo, making reference to “the diluted power” (Sotomayor 2016: 78) of the state. Similarly, Moncado also believes that the decentralization of the state failed to confront violence (Moncado 2016: 228), leading informal groups to seize the governance role. Attributing to external factors, Betancur argues that “economic and legitimacy crises”, that the state failed to deal with decomposed its governance (Betancur 2017: 134). For instance, the collapse of the manufacturing economy and its following social decomposition caused by the distrust between citizens and the state raised the doubt in governability. Even focusing on the differing political-economic policies of Medellín, these scholars collectively affirm the state's disempowerment due to decentralization. The state's weakened authority led to a governance vacuum, enabling armed groups to assume roles typically reserved for formal institutions.

In contrast, scholars Rozema, Civico, and Rueda argue that the state is functionally present, and its relationship with informal groups is based on strategic collaboration and interdependence. Drawing on the philosophical theories of Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 352), Civico argues that paramilitary groups are autonomous “war-machine” entities that exist outside the state (Civico 2012: 80). However, the state often captures and appropriates these external forces to serve its objectives, thereby acquiring the paramilitary groups as its own war machines, as extensions of its authority. For example, even if paramilitary members are demobilized, police and formal army look for them at their shelters and ask for collaboration in cleaning criminals (Civico 2012: 78). Similar to Civico, Rueda also agrees that paramilitary groups function as an extension of the state. However, she argues that the state instrumentalizes paramilitaries for social control purposes (Rueda 2016: 101), interpreting the informal armed actors as a social management tool. Rozema also highlights the interdependence of the state and the paramilitary groups. Specifically, the local paramilitary and the official army work closely together; once the army returns to their barracks, the paramilitary remains to surveil and police the neighborhood (Rozema 2008: 425). In this case, Rozema argues that the state uses paramilitaries as delegated policing instruments. Interpreting paramilitaries as a war machine, social management tool, and delegate policing instrument acquired by the state, these three scholars all confirm the sovereignty and presence of Medellín’s state.

Collectively, these perspectives reveal two distinct and competing interpretations of Medellín’s governance: one sees state disempowerment as enabling informal groups to fill a state-caused power vacuum; while the other views the state as strategically utilizing these informal groups to extend its authority. 

Methodologies: Data-Driven and Ethnography

Top-Down: Data and Economic Indicators

Two groups of scholars employ distinct methodologies as data-driven (Melguizo 2001, Betancur 2007, Moncado 2016, Sotomayor 2016) and ethnographic (Rozema 2008, Civico 2012, Rueda 2016). The distinct methodologies give rise to different conclusions regarding the reasons behind the emergence of informal groups as government providers.

Scholars arguing for the state’s absence predominantly employ statistical data as their primary or secondary evidence. This data-driven methodology predominantly relies on sources from the state's official records, and national and local administrative departments (Betancur 2007: 130, Melguizo 2001: 116, Moncado 2016: 238). By calculating through the economic model, Moncado points out that the homicide rate reaches the highest level in the most violent, poorest areas in Medellín (Moncado 2016: 237). Additionally, the growing number of annual deaths and displaced population (Melguizo 2001: 116, Sotomayor 2016: 77), coupled with the decreasing unemployment rate (Betancur 2007: 131), are constantly used to illustrate the state’s inactivity or ineffectiveness in addressing social and economic disorders. This leads to the characterization of a failing state in default of its duties.

Betancur and Meiguizo also analyze broad labor mobility trends between formal and informal sectors. They specifically examine the expansion of the informal economy alongside the decline in employment within traditional industries, such as manufacturing, and interpret this pattern as causal (Meiguizo 2001: 114; Betancur 2007: 130). By framing formal and informal economies as two competing sectors in a “zero-sum game,” they argue that the rise of the informal economy directly results from the decline of the formal sector, a process of economy downgrading (Betancur 2007: 126). This approach reflects a state-centric perspective, suggesting that a disempowered state has driven a market transition increasingly dominated by an ever-growing informal economy.

Together, these scholars examine socio-economic patterns reflected by data: shifts in homicide rate, death, and economic indicators, adopting a top-down perspective in proposing that the absence of the state gave birth to an informal economy and groups.

Bottom-Up: Ethnography and Interviews

By contrast, ethnography is the most commonly used methodology for scholars who propose the presence of state control. Cvico, Rozema, and Rueda establish their research primarily based on local archives, multiple in-person field visits, and interviews. Through semi-structured (Rueda 2016) and snowball sampling (Civico 2012, Rozema 2008) interviews, they investigate individual former paramilitary group members’ experiences. Interviewees across three studies point out that joint operations between legal army and paramilitary groups are common. For instance, Rueda notes, “The army and the police asked us (paramilitaries) for help” (Rueda 2016: 92). Similarly, Civico, drawing on both interviews and archival evidence, states, “The forces of the Cacique Nutibara (paramilitaries) arrived in the Comuna 13 as part of an alliance with the Army” (Civico 2012: 89). Rozema also highlights this collaboration, noting that “the army and local paramilitary leaders had signed an agreement about a two-day military operation” (Rozema 2008: 439). The paramilitaries fulfill responsibilities as the legal army and police - maintaining public order, surveillance, and patrolling, while still retaining the illegal character of its organization. This leads paramilitaries to often fall into a grey area between illegality and legality (Rueda 2016: 87). Due to this feature, paramilitaries can execute “dirty work” - social cleansing or suppression actions - that legal armed forces could not undertake without scrutiny, thereby the state utilizes paramilitary groups as a proxy for social management.

Interviews also allow these authors to focus on the personal circumstances and background stories of paramilitary group members. Specifically, because almost all interviewees were unemployed prior to joining the paramilitaries or other informal groups (Rueda 2016: 89), the abundance of informal employment vacancies gives most people, especially teenagers, viable employment options (Rozema 2008: 441). Teenagers from marginalized neighborhoods, particularly in the city's northwest, often form small gangs for robbery or, more commonly, are targeted for recruitment into drug trafficking networks due to lack of economic opportunities and exposure to criminal influences (Civico 2012: 82). In this case, these scholars highlight how structural economic hardships drive individuals to join informal groups. Rather than examining broad systemic trends as their counterparts  (Melguizo 2001, Betancur 2007, Moncado 2016, Sotomayor 2016) did, this approach centers on the agency of individuals. By doing so, these scholars argue that informal groups, such as paramilitaries, emerge not from the absence of the state but depend on each individual's will for survival, thereby reflecting a grassroots, bottom-up perspective.

Collectively, three studies rely on ethnographic methodologies. By focusing on personal narratives, they form a bottom-up approach revealing the interdependence between the informal groups’ emergence and the young individuals, and the state strategically uses informal groups, specifically paramilitaries, as an extension of its authority to conduct social cleansing. 

Units of Analysis: Institutional and Organizational/Individual

Institutional Frameworks: Systemic Patterns and Dualisms

These two groups of scholars also use varying terminologies and categories to distinguish the social actors driving Medellín to become a violent city. This reflects their distinct analytical units as institutional (Melguizo 2001, Betancur 2007, Moncado 2016, Sotomayor 2016) or individual (Rozema 2008, Civico 2012, Rueda 2016), which lead them to conceptualize the relationship between the state and informal groups differently.

Scholars who argue for the state’s absence adopt an institutional framework, categorizing social actors into distinct modular units such as formal and informal, legal and illegal, public and private. For example, Melguizo describes the socio-economic dynamics of Medellín, stating that “growing participation in the informal sector leads the political party to lose their ability to present their people” (Melguizo 2001: 114). Similarly, Betancur argues that “the dominance of informal economies and the presence of informal groups speaks to the inability of the government to govern” (Betancur 2007: 126). By using institutional units, these scholars frame the relationship between formal and informal, or legal and illegal, as oppositional dualisms, reinforcing the boundaries between them.

Furthermore, discussions on public-private relationships frequently attribute governance failures to the disconnection between these two spheres. Focusing on patterns of political order, Moncado argues that public-private partnerships shape governance and security in Medellín (Moncado 2016: 229); consequently, their disconnect is central to the governance crisis. Sotomayor and Betancur emphasize the dominance of the private sector, with Betancur noting how “the private sector imposes its agenda on an enfeebled civil society” (Betancur 2007: 135), while Sotomayor highlights how such dominance results in socio-spatial inequalities (Sotomayor 2016: 74). Institutional units lead these scholars to conceptualize and describe private and public sectors as two unified, monolithic entities, lacking specific examples of how the private sector demonstrates its dominance or disconnect from the public sector.

Ultimately, this reliance on institutional units leads scholars to portray governance as a binary struggle between public and private, also defining formal and informal as two non-intersecting spheres.

Individual Units: Actor-Oriented and Parallel Actors

By contrast, Rozema, Civico, and Rueda adopt actor-oriented organizational and individual units, taking interpersonal approaches to understand the social actors in Medellín. Instead of using the generalized umbrella term “informal group,” they break down and categorize actors into specific organizational units such as paramilitary, guerrillas, drug cartels, gangs, and arms traffickers (Rozema 2008, Civico 2012, Rueda 2016). Focusing on each specific organization, these scholars see the relationship between varying informal groups and the state as more complex and fluid. For example, Civico describes instances where legal military and paramilitary groups collaborated to ambush guerrilla forces (Civico 2012: 85), while Rueda documents cases where drug traffickers sought protection under the umbrella of paramilitary groups (Rueda 2016: 92). Rozema further illustrates how paramilitaries absorbed former members of the legal army and gangs (Rozema 2008: 432). By zooming in to observe specific individual group units, these three scholars argue for an inconsistent, often shifting, pattern of interaction and alliances between these actors and with the state, divergent from the oppositional dualism of social actors proposed by the opposite scholars (Melguizo 2001, Betancur 2007, Moncado 2016, Sotomayor 2016).

Moreover, these scholars often distinguish between different paramilitary groups, with differing names and their leaders specified. For example, Rozema notes several confrontations and collaborations between different paramilitary groups: the fight between the Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) and the Bloque Metro (BM), and later United Self-Defense Colombia (AUC) reorganized and absorbed BCN under its umbrella (Rozema 2008: 439). This actor-oriented approach highlights the heterogeneity of each group’s leadership structures and hierarchies, rather than unified entirety. Civico also consistently uses “paramilitaries” in a plural form (Civico 2012: 90), to emphasize the agency and individuality of each independent group. Even though these three scholars all identify a pattern of collaboration between the state and paramilitaries, the state is interpreted as one among many parallel actors or competing power players, just as paramilitaries could also work as private militias for drug traffickers, transnational enterprises, or elites (Rueda 2016: 100).

Together, Rozema, Civico, and Rueda take on smaller, organizational units of analysis to understand the subdivisions of “informal groups,” and suggest a more fluid, shifting interaction within them. Therefore, they argue that the state is in parallel with paramilitaries, along with other informal groups.

Conclusion

The governance dynamics in Medellín reflect a complex interplay between formal state structures and informal governance providers. This literature review has shown how variations in methodological approaches and units of analysis shape competing interpretations of the state's role in governing Medellín. Scholars Melguizo, Betancur, Moncado, and Sotomayor arguing for state absence emphasize systematic failures, drawing on statistical and economic indicators to emphasize how the erosion of formal governance paved the way for informal groups to assume public service roles. In contrast, scholars Rozema, Civico, and Rueda who advocate for state presence rely on ethnographic methodologies to uncover the strategic collaboration and interdependence between the state and informal actors, such as paramilitaries, framing them as extensions of state power. Additionally, institutional units often simplify governance as a dualistic struggle between formal and informal sectors, while organizational and individual units recognize informal groups as heterogeneous and independent entities, thereby identifying the relations between state and informal groups as parallel.

Bridging these polarized perspectives requires acknowledging the coexistence - although seemingly contradictory - of state absence and presence in Medellín’s governance. Relations of competing, allying, or excluding between formal and informal sectors should be understood as temporary situational statuses shaped by context and could vary depending on the perspectives of the examination. A thorough understanding of interactions among social actors regardless of the nature of formality or informality, in marginalized and precarious urban settings like Medellín can illuminate how governance outcomes are shaped and adapted. This will further provide insights into the evolving nature of state-society, and formal-informal relations in volatile contexts worldwide. 

References

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